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I have argued elsewhere that parents have a right to shape their children's values, subject of course to opposing rights of children and of society. Scott Altman, Parental Control Rights, in Philosophical Foundations of Children's and Family Law, Lucinda Ferguson & Elizabeth Brake, Eds, (forthcoming 2017). The claim that parents have even a prima facie right to direct their children's upbringing is, of course, controversial See, e.g., Colin Macleod, Conceptions of Parental Autonomy, 25 Pol. & Soc. 117 (1997) . 2 This example is based on a class action suit in Israel against the government for allowing such schools to exist. For details on the law suit in Israel, see In Case of Second-rate ultra-Orthodox Education, the State Blames the Victims, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.721448. parents owed their son preparation for a secular life might be thought to depend on a child's right to autonomy or to an open future.
The fundamentalist parents would likely object to this approach, claiming that they have no reason to protect autonomy (which they do not value) and that they need not prepare their child for a life that conflicts with their values. This paper provides a response to their concerns. 3 Following a Rawlsian project of seeking overlapping consensus, it tries to show that the fundamentalist parents are in fact being asked to protect goods that are consistent with their values and that do not depend on autonomy.
The paper identifies two goods that parents sometimes undermine when shaping their children's values: authenticity and identification. It argues that these can be recognized as primary goods by both liberals and fundamentalists. The paper then shows how we might reconceptualize the right to an open future as protecting authenticity and identification rather than autonomy.
I. Liberalism and Value Inculcation
Scholars have long debated whether and how parents may try to shape their children's values. Some writers would severely constrain such efforts, except when necessary to help children develop a sense of justice. 4 More moderate writers allow that children benefit from deep engagement with their parents' views, and from the experience of commitment and community that comes from this engagement. According to these writers, parents may try to 3 In a companion paper, I offer a second reply: reasonable cooperation in a pluralist society requires respect for the anticipated values of one's grown children. See Altman, Taking Precautions when Shaping a Child's Values (draft). influence their children's values, but must take steps to protect their children's autonomy. For example, parents must expose their children to alternative views, must teach them to keep an open mind, and must take measures to prevent indoctrination or brainwashing. 5 Writers who urge such autonomy-protecting limits worry that children unduly sheltered from external views, or withdrawn too early from education, may grow up to lack rational autonomy. 6 Reconciling parents' right to inculcate values with children's right to autonomy is usually treated as a task for applied ethics. But the topic also implicates political philosophy by raising questions about the appropriate role of government. Writers who embrace political liberalism believe that the state must remain neutral as to visions of a good life, including being neutral as to whether rational autonomy is a better way to live than deferential embrace of religious law or traditional values. 7 The neutrality required here is neutrality of justification -the state cannot rely on the superiority of an autonomous life as a reason for regulation -not neutrality of effect. On this view, parents cannot be compelled to protect their children's autonomy merely because it believes that autonomous lives are better lives. The claim that strict religions offer training inconsistent with rational autonomy has itself been criticized as mistaken. E.g. Shelley Burtt, In defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools in NOMOS XXXVIII at 412, 416-17 (arguing that religions do teach critical reasoning, but often reject radical skepticism).
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A Rawlsian account of political liberalism can be distinguished from various perfectionist views sometimes called autonomy liberalism or ethical liberalism. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 199-200 (1993) (requiring that children be taught their constitutional and civic rights, but that they need not be educated in the values of autonomy or individuality). Although Rawls is reasonably clear that liberalism cannot insist on the value of autonomy, he admits that in practice, liberalism may require institutions that happen to encourage autonomy. This is so both because training to participate in political society may require skills affiliated with autonomy and because development of the two moral powers (a sense of justice and a capacity to have a conception of the good) may demand some qualities related to autonomy. See also Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (2011). This demand for neutrality about autonomy is controversial. 8 Even writers who generally support neutrality often reject it in this context. Some think autonomy necessary for democratic legitimacy or membership in the moral community. 9 Others think that demands for neutrality do not apply to childrearing. 10 Many readers will find this assumption unattractive. The point of making it is to explore one of political liberalism's core goals: to see whether those with opposing conceptions of the good can reach agreement on principles of cooperation. In this spirit, the paper aims to include reasonable fundamentalists in this project by asking whether those who do not value autonomy can agree with those who do about children's rights. 12 Even with this strict assumption, I will argue, political liberalism provides grounds for criticizing and constraining some parenting choices that shelter children and shape their values.
For readers who are unsympathetic to this sort of neutrality, I offer another justification for not presuming the value of autonomy: its fragility has been overstated in the literature on childrearing. The skills needed to lead a self-directed life (including the ability to become moderately self-reflective, or to conform one's actions to one's values) are not hard to attain or easy to suppress. They arise naturally for most people during adolescence. And even if these skills turn out not to arise naturally, but instead requires effort and practice, it is unclear that failure to learn these skills as a child disadvantages those who seek to develop the skills as adults in the way that failure to learn a foreign language as a child does. 13 The main aspect of autonomy that parents can suppress is the desire (as opposed to the ability) to engage in critical self-reflection. If making self-reflection unattractive is a culpable parenting decision, it is 12 By reasonable fundamentalist I mean a person who believes that God's revealed word must be strictly obeyed (the fundamentalist part), but that people who do not share this faith are entitled to respect, and that part of this respect includes finding reasonable terms of cooperation in governing matters of joint concern. Reasonable terms of cooperation are those that can be justified using public values that can be accepted by all. There is a significant worry here about whether we can regard most fundamentalist sects as reasonable given their attitudes toward gender equality. The issue is relevant even to the education of boys, since the decision to prioritize religious study for me relies on unequal distribution of both paid and unpaid work to women. As well, there are some reasons to doubt that many ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel count as reasonable under a Rawlsian framework because they can be seen as not cooperating fairly with other citizens. For example, they do not serve in the military and design their lives to draw heavily on public assistance 13 See Moschella at 129. one that can be attributed to many parents, not only among fundamentalists, but also among those of us who devote our free time to consumption or to entertainment. An account of autonomy that requires being inclined toward critical self-reflection may simply be too demanding. If I am right in thinking that parents cannot easily undermine the capacity for autonomy, focusing on harms unrelated to this capacity may allow us better to see a set of other under-discussed harms.
II.
The http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/226 own perspective) if he grew up to be secular and lacked secular education than he would be if he grew up to be religious and lacked a childhood devoted primarily to religious texts.
Treating value inculcation as risk imposition can clarify children's rights. Joel Feinberg famously suggested that children have the right to an open future. 15 The idea is that parents must protect the future autonomy of the adults their children will become. In its strongest form, the right entitles children to as many valuable options in adulthood as their parents can feasibly provide.
This maximizing interpretation --providing as many options as feasible --was criticized for being indeterminate (how do you count options), incoherent (all choices both foreclose some options and create others) and undesirable (a childhood spent preserving options for the future would be exhausting, unpleasant, and pointless). 16 Parenting by preserving all future options resembles the behavior of hoarders, who cannot dispose of any item because it might someday be useful.
In response, some authors proposed a more modest version of the right to an open future:
parents should help children reach adulthood with a meaningful variety of options. 17 Although this interpretation is appealing, it too faces a problem. Whether a set of options is meaningfully varied might depend on a person's values and preferences. As one critic put it:
Presumably Feinberg is thinking in this way. An Amish child is prepared by his Amish parents for one future only, that of an Amish farmer, whereas the non-Amish child has open to him a wide range of futures: as a farmer, scientist, teacher, race car driver, doctor, and so on . . . . But . . . from the point of view of the Amish parent all the various career options mentioned above have little variety among them: They are all ways of living in the world, pursuing money, prestige, and professional satisfaction, focusing on worldly rewards rather than on living in harmony with 537, 547 (2006) God. The Amish parents could well reply that they are giving their children options: to be a corn farmer, or a soybean farmer, or a fruit farmer, or to work in various support occupations, such as blacksmith or leather worker. 18 This imprecision in what it means for options to be varied was thought to deprive the idea of varied options of any power to guide behavior. But if we think of parenting as risk It might be thought that so few fundamentalist children abandon their parents' faith that risk assessment would permit such parents to deny their children secular education. I address this argument in some detail in another article. See Altman, Taking Precautions when Shaping a Child's Values. In fact, the rate of defection from fundamentalist sects is not tiny. In Israel, about 6% of ultra-Orthodox Jews leave the group as adults. The number of the US is not readily available, but is thought to be somewhat higher. 20 There is some debate over whether the right to an open future is a positive right -to have opportunities created -or a negative right -not to have opportunities impeded. Joseph Millum, The Foundation of the Child's or less appealing, or simply less likely to be chosen -all to greater or lesser extent. For example, in the Talmud to Tech case, the claim is not that former ultra-Orthodox Jews cannot seek remedial training and ultimately find work in a secular world. Rather, the claim is that the burden of doing so is very large, which makes their options unreasonably limited.
Providing children with varied options is not only about education. Options can be made psychologically difficult even when they are practically available. For example, a child raised by white supremacist parents might grow up to reject his upbringing, but to be so frightened by people of color as to be unable to sustain friendships or collegial relations with them. 21 Or a child raised in a rigid home may come to yearn for a life of spontaneity, but be unable to enact the life she wants. Depending on the psychological challenges involved in making these transitions and on the importance of the options, one might think these children deprived of a reasonable set of options.
Finally, an open future might be thought to include some of the intellectual capacities connected to rational autonomy: the capacity to act on one's commitments, the ability to subject one's views and commitments to scrutiny, and a capacity to change those views that do not survive scrutiny. The argument is not that these capacities are inherently good, or even instrumentally good, for all people. Rather it is that they are important for people who come to value these capacities, and that parents should foresee that their children might come to do so.
Right to an Open Future, 45 J. Soc. Phil. 522 (2014). My argument does not presume a positive duty generally. It merely constrains risk imposing behavior.
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For an example of a child overcoming this problem, see, The white flight of Derek Black, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-white-flight-of-derek-black/2016/10/15/ed5f906a-8f3b-11e6-a6a3-d50061aa9fae_story.html.
III.
Autonomy to Authenticity There are several related characteristics that, while important, I do not mean to incorporate. The first is that the values we believe to be ours actually are the values that should be attributed to us -i.e. that we not be deluded about our own characteristics. See Geofffrey Sayre-McCord and Michael Smith, Desires…and beliefs…of one's own 129 in Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman (2014, Vargas & Yaffee eds). The second is that our values correspond with the values we believe we ought to have. A third is our values are much the same as they would be were we to think carefully and be fully informed. A fourth is that our values did not come to be our values through coercion, deceit, or deprivation. authentically. The harm imposed in Talmud to Tech can be understood as making authenticity difficult by imposing a large barrier to pursuing a secular life.
To be effective, the good of authenticity requires a second good, often called identification.
If the values and desires we have strike us as foreign, as not our own, we are less likely to find satisfaction in the connection between our projects and our values, since we will be alienated from both. 26 I do not mean by identification with a value that the value must be consciously affirmed, that the value must be the object of higher-order beliefs, or that the value must have survived critical scrutiny. I mean only that you experience the value as your own -or at least that do not experience it as foreign. 27 So far, I have advanced the following main points. When parents aim to shape their children's values, they sometimes impose significant risks. The question of how a desire or value can belong to us if it also strikes us as foreign has been much discussed. On one account, the desire might belong to us because it is robust -that is persistent and not easily disturbed. See Sayre-McCord and Smith, Desires…and beliefs…of one's own supra. Another account suggests that values belong to us insofar as they accurately describe us. We feel alienation, on this account, when a value or desire that is truly ours also conflicts with our self-image. See Schroeder and Arpaly, supra. necessary for their child to live authentically, they have reason to provide such options. The point of this reformulation is to provide a basis for children's rights that can be accepted both by liberals and by fundamentalists.
The strategy of emphasizing authenticity and identification only works if it meets two conditions. First, these ideals must actually be acceptable to reasonable people with varied conceptions of the good. In particular, they must not secretly import contested elements of autonomy. Second, they must be sufficiently appealing to count as primary goods -things that make a life go better on any account of a good life.
The modest versions of authenticity and identification outlined above do not depend on valorizing autonomy. One need not value a self-directed life or critical examination of one's values to see a benefit in having activities that match one's values and experiencing those values as one's own. This claim might seem suspicious for several reasons. I employ authenticity and identification to argue for the importance of varied options, at least for most people. Surely an argument that aims to protect options must be an argument that favors autonomy. But this observation misunderstands autonomy's core virtue, which is self-direction. Not every argument for options is an argument for self-direction. For example, a totalitarian state might allow citizens choose their careers because doing so maximizes overall productivity. They are protecting choice, but not in the service of a self-directed life. Similarly, some religions emphasize the importance of temptation because avoiding evil leads one to God. Choice is central to this view of human good. But choice is not valorized because self-direction is inherently valuable. Choice is important because it allows one to choose God. This is a serious challenge. But I do not think it decisive. I acknowledge that a religious person may place no value on the match between her actions and her beliefs other than believing her actions are the right path to human good, and that good therefore depends on those specific acts. But a reasonable religious person will recognize that everyone has this view about their actions and beliefs. What it means to hold a belief about the good is to believe that acting on those beliefs is good. Recognition of this general fact will allow a religious person to see the general value in authenticity -which is the value of being able to act on one's conception of the good.
A second version of this objection might come from someone who believes that a good life is one lived in conformity with God's commandments. Although sincere belief in God, or in the virtue of obedience, is perhaps beneficial, all that really matters is conformity. To this person, authenticity is no more neutral about the good than is autonomy. Indeed it is not consistent with recognizing people as rational.
Having a conception of the good serves no purpose for a rational person unless that conception is connected to her actions. Rationality means trying to act in accordance with one's values and beliefs. A conception of the good that denies the value of authenticity is a conception that is indifferent to whether people act on their beliefs, and is thus indifferent to rationality. This is a conception of the good that fundamentally denies the importance of holding a conception of the good. In this respect, it is not a reasonable form of fundamentalism.
Even if authenticity and identification do not mask any controversial values, are they actually attractive? In some ways, they seem too limited to be basic human goods.
Authenticity on my telling is the match between values and actions. This seems to be little more than congruence -a mere mathematical virtue, or worse, the sort of matchy-matchy aesthetic promoted by bad home décor magazines. And identification has been reduced to the absence of alienation -which is just a form of psychological pain. Surely we aim for more than this in life.
These are indeed pale values. They are described this way intentionally so they can fit into I use the term primary good here loosely -as a good that can be important to any person and harmful to none. But arguably these are primary goods in the sense Rawls uses this word.
Rawls identifies the capacity to have a conception of the good as one of two moral powers.
Authenticity -the match between one's actions and one's values -is what typically happens when a person both has a conception of the good and then acts on that conception. In this sense, it is no accident that authenticity and identification fit within many conceptions of the good, since they are the outcomes of acting successfully on a conception of the good.
Recognizing authenticity and identification as primary goods reveals two ways that parents risk impairing their children when shaping their values. First, children may grow up unable to pursue projects that match their values because their parents have made those projects very hard to pursue. Denying children secular education risks this impairment for adults who want a secular life. Second, children may grow up to be alienated from the values or desires they hold.
A child who rejects her parents' racist teachings, but who continues to be haunted by her own racist feelings, is an example. This example shows the connection between identification and authenticity. The child both finds her values to be foreign (alienation) and, as a result, is unable to sustain the kinds of personal relationships that she believes important (inauthenticity).
Many liberals will balk at this account because it looks only to outcomes and not to process.
They will want to know how parents produced a child whose projects match her values. 28 What if the child arrived at this state because her upbringing made it hard to do otherwise? For example, perhaps she came to identify with her values as a psychological coping mechanism; identification with available roles seemed psychologically easier than alienation or self-hatred.
How should we evaluate identification with values that arise from suspect origins? Consider a religious adult who was raised in a closed and rigid community. She has no significant doubts about the value of her life. But she came to feel this way because she saw no practical alternatives to the life she leads. Realizing this, she became initially resigned, then content, and ultimately enthusiastic about the life that was available. Assume that her current view turns out to be stable and long-lasting. Can a liberal state condemn her upbringing because it has produced the wrong kinds of identification with her values? I think that the answer is no. Unless we import controversial views about the value of autonomy, the state must treat this kind of identification as equally valuable to one born of intense self-examination and an open-minded upbringing. But I do think we have reason to condemn as unreasonably risky several of the methods that might have produced this identification -a topic to which I now turn. made it difficult for him to pursue a life in which his values match his projects. Second, he can remain part of the group, fully committed to its practices (perhaps because he lowered his expectations in response to his poor life-prospects outside the group, or perhaps because he simply regards his religious life as the right way to live). Third, he can stay, without being committed to the life he now leads or desiring any particular other life. Perhaps he identifies with his secular impulses, but cannot rid himself of the intense feeling that departure would be disloyal. Or perhaps he finds his secular impulses to be foreign. In either case, this third child is alienated. 29 Parents who take aggressive steps to shape their children's values impose a significant risk that the child will end up in the third category rather than the second. This is a harm beyond the one I identified toward the first child. And it is a particularly serious harm. Or so I will argue. One might think that the first and third case are really the same, but that the third version is simply more limited as to options. But this seems to me mistaken. In the first case, the person is acting on a new set of values that he identifies with. In the third case, there may be no new set of animating values, simply alienation from the values that he has. This idea -sometimes labeled estrangement -is discussed in Cheshire Calhoun, Losing One's Self in Practical Identity and Narrative Agency 193, 198 (Atkins and MacKenzie, eds. 2008) .
People experience alienation and inauthenticity for many reasons. For example, some academics come to disdain the abstract and isolated nature of their work. They may quit their jobs. Or, if they are timid or have few other options, they may remain in place, but no longer embrace the values that led them to their careers. This is an unhappy outcome. But it is at least an outcome that the academic likely attributes to her own bad choice (of careers) or bad character (for being timid) or bad luck (for not having alternatives).
What if instead she became an academic because she was tricked into choosing this career?
Her alienation was made more likely by this trickery (insofar as such methods often wear off).
And it is worse when it arises. The academic who chose poorly finds herself pursuing values that are no longer hers, but that she at least can see as having been hers in the past. If she comes to see that she was tricked into embracing those values, then her alienation is increased.
In retrospect, she regards herself as never having pursed her own values, but as having been in another's control.
The tricked academic's fate illustrates a distinct wrong parents can commit while shaping their children's values. Some techniques for shaping values have a higher chance that their effects will fade. These tactics raise the chance of producing outcomes one and three rather than outcome two. And when they produce outcome three, the experience of alienation is likely to be especially severe, as its victims will feel themselves not only alienated from their current values, but also as never having held those values as their own at all.
Of course, the case of coming to reject your parents' values differs from the academic who rejects values she chose in the past. No child will look back on her parents' values as those she freely embraced. But she may well regard them as her own values as a child (or simply her family's values) insofar as she does not regard the methods of inculcation as having been manipulative or coercive.
The parental duty I propose is quite narrow. On my account, parents must take precautions to reduce the risk of their child living an inauthentic and alienated life. This requires that the parent consider whether their value-shaping efforts might make an authentic life unreasonably difficult should those efforts fail. But parents need not provide their children with the easiest possible path toward an authentic and identified life. They need only to reduce the risk of rendering their children disabled, that is making it unreasonably difficult for them to lead authentic and identified lives. 30 Allowing a religious child to reach adulthood with the secular education of a small child counts as such a disability. Refusing to pay for college (when student loans are available) or expressing a desire for the child to remain religious does not render the child disabled from pursuing an authentic life. These acts no doubt make the choice to leave a community more difficult. But not every difficulty is a harm.
Why should my argument be limited to disabling harms rather than to all losses. i.e. shouldn't parents be obligated to maximize their children's chance at pursuing projects that match their values by minimizing the expected difficulty of doing so? I see several reasons against this position. First, parents have a right to direct their children's upbringing. This right must be balanced against contrary children's interests. But it will not always be subordinate.
This means that parents should sometimes be permitted to make negative expected-value decisions for their children. Second, we usually cannot be confident that some outcome is in expectation bad unless it is quite severely bad. When the expected outcome is not clearly harmful (because we lack information or because of incommensurability) parents should be entitled to discretion. Third, some parenting choices -such the one in Talmud to Techrequire parents to facilitate outcomes that they regard as morally objectionable. Parents have reasonable claims not be compelled to be complicit in such outcomes. Those claims must be subordinated to children's rights when there is no other way to prevent serious harm. But when these harms become less serious, the right of non-complicity may dominate. 31 The duty is also narrow because for most people, there is more than one path toward authenticity. Recognizing this allows me to avoid the maximizing problem that plagued 
IV.
Objections and Conclusion
Before concluding, I want to address two objections. First, my argument focuses on risks that parents impose when they try to shape their children's values but do not fully succeed.
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More detailed discussions about incommensurability and about complicity can be found in Altman, Taking Precautions These failures can arise when children want lives other than the ones their parents prepared them for, or when the children experience as foreign the values instilled by their parents. Does this mean that infallible permanent brainwashing would not wrong children, and that the only ills of parental manipulations stem from the chance that they fail?
The term brainwashing is controversial. If it means causing cognitive impairment, then nothing I have said justifies brainwashing. But if brainwashing means entrenching a person's values and desires using manipulative techniques, then on the political-liberal account presumed in this paper, I see no basis for government intervention against infallible, permanent, brainwashing of children -unless the content of that brainwashing is unreasonable, or is inconsistent with the cooperation needed in the moral community or for civic participation. At the same time, I do not think this objection has much practical bite, as the idea of infallible permanent brainwashing is a fantasy. 32 I acknowledge, however, that because my theory relies on risk assessment, it may sometimes permit parents to use techniques that some people describe as brainwashing. This would depend on the likelihood of failure and the severity of associate harms.
A second objection is that my argument mirrors the theory sometimes mocked as "selfjustifying paternalism." The idea is that any paternalistic act might be warranted if we could be reasonably sure of its later ratification. This argument is called self-justifying because it seems to bless any practice that can indoctrinate someone into believing in its validity, no matter how awful the practice. 33 Although my argument has in common with this sort of paternalism the validation of an intervention if the person can be expected to value the outcome, it differs significantly in its approach. People ridicule self-justifying paternalism because the alleged consent involved does not seem real, and because it makes a mockery of autonomy by finding autonomy in subservience. I am not relying on the approval of adults to their parents' indoctrination as a justification, or on any theory of autonomy. Rather, I am asking whether the parents harmed the later adult by making authenticity or identification difficult -a question of harm rather than consent. Indeed, in many cases where there is not retroactive approval, there is also not any real harm. For example, secular adults may disapprove of their parents for forcing them to pray every day as children. But unless they suffer some serious setback to their adult lives, I do not think they have grounds to complain. Resenting the fact that your parents forced you to pray is not the same as being unable to identify with values that you hold, or being unable to pursue meaningful projects. One is a mere regret; the other is a disability. This paper set out to examine how parents' efforts to shape their children's values are limited by children's interests. It took as a constraint the assumption that autonomy cannot be privileged over other ways of life, a constraint intended to allow common ground between liberals and reasonable fundamentalists. 
